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INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Although not constitutionally required, it has become considerably 
more commonplace for law enforcement to electronically record a 
suspect’s custodial interrogation. This includes a complete recording, 
beginning with the advice of rights and continuing through the end of the 
interrogation. In fact, society now recognizes it as a useful, if not 
necessary, tool for law enforcement. 
[2] Law enforcement officials initially resisted this investigative 
technique. Today, however, many officials have come to see the 
substantial benefits associated with the recording of a suspect’s custodial 
interrogation. The usual reasons given in opposition to recording 
confessions include concerns that the suspect will refuse to talk and 
confessions will be lost, juries will be offended by the sometimes 
necessary aggressive techniques used by the police to obtain a confession, 
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the equipment will malfunction during an interrogation, and the high costs 
associated with supplying a room with the necessary equipment.1  
[3] This change in law enforcement’s attitude towards electronic 
recording of custodial interrogations has occurred for a number of reasons. 
These include the notoriety associated with false confessions,2 concerns 
about adequacy of the Miranda warnings, lawsuits filed against police 
officers, enhanced investigations, reduction of suppression motions, 
strengthening of the prosecutor’s case,3 increased guilty pleas,4 and 
increased confidence by the public in the criminal justice system.5 
Potential jurors expect that law enforcement will record a suspect’s 
confession because the camcorder technology used for such recordings is 
readily accessible and inexpensive. Jurors may wonder why a police 
department failed to record something as significant as a defendant’s 
confession, especially when the justice system requires jurors to consider 
whether a confession was voluntary and reliable. 
 
                                                                                                                         
1 Lisa C. Oliver, Mandatory Recording of Custodial Interrogations Nationwide: 
Recommending a New Model Code, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 263, 280–81 (2005). 
2 It has been estimated that approximately fourteen to twenty-five percent of exonerations 
based upon DNA testing involved false confessions. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. 
Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 
902 (2004); Innocenceproject.org, False Confessions & Mandatory Recording of 
Interrogations, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/False-Confessions.php (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2010) (stating that over twenty-five percent of convictions reversed through 
DNA testing have involved false confessions). 
3 See Oliver, supra note 1, at 283–84. 
4 For example, in a survey of 246 police departments in Texas that have electronic 
recording polices, over sixty-four percent indicated that recording confessions protects 
police officers from claims of abuse by suspects, strengthens the prosecutor’s case, and 
increases ability to focus on the investigation since the traditional need to take notes has 
been significantly reduced. THE JUSTICE PROJECT, ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS IN TEXAS: A REVIEW OF CURRENT STATUTES, PRACTICES, 
AND POLICIES 2–3, http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/texas_ 
recording_write-up.pdf. 
5 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-406 (2009). 
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[4] Over 500 jurisdictions have now enacted policies and procedures 
requiring their officers to record confessions in certain circumstances.6 At 
present, seventeen states and the District of Columbia have enacted such 
requirements through the state legislature,7 court decision,8 amendment to 
the state’s rules of evidence,9 or by court rules.10 Even in the states that 
have not mandated recording, numerous police departments have 
voluntarily instituted a policy requiring some type of recording 
requirement.11 
[5] This Article will survey those states where law enforcement 
personnel are required to electronically record a suspect’s post-arrest 
 
                                                                                                                         
6 See Innocenceproject.org, supra note 2. 
7 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 5-116.01 (2009); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 405/5-401.5, 
5/103-2.1 (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B(1)(K) (2009); MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-402 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 590.700 (West 2009); 
MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 46-4-407(2), 46-4-408 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4503 
(2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-16 (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-211 
(West 2009); 2009 OR. LAWS ch.488 (relating to custodial interrogations; creating new 
provisions and amending OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540) (adopted June 24, 2009); TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3 (Vernon 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.073, 
972.115 (West 2009). 
8 See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 1985); State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 
449, 454 (Iowa 2006); Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533–34 
(Mass. 2004); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1994); State v. Barnett, 789 
A.2d 629, 632 (N.H. 2001). Contra Starks v. State, 594 So. 2d 187, 196 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1991); People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213, 241–43 (Cal. 1997); Coleman v. State, 375 S.E.2d 
663, 664 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Kekona, 886 P.2d 740, 745–46 (Haw. 1994); 
Brashars v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 58, 63 (Ky. 2000); State v. Thibodeaux, 750 So. 
2d 916, 923 (La. 1999); Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 201, 208 (Miss. 1988); State v. 
Smith, 684 N.E.2d 668, 686 (Ohio 1997); Commonwealth v. Craft, 669 A.2d 394, 397 
(Pa. 1995).   
9 IND. R. EVID. 617(effective Jan. 1, 2011).  
10 See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 3.17. 
11 THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, DEPARTMENTS THAT CURRENTLY RECORD A MAJORITY OF 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
wrongfulconvictions/issues/Causesandremedies/falseconfessions/ PDDEPTLIST.pdf. 
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statements. It will also compare, contrast, and consider the more 
significant provisions commonly associated with this requirement. This 
includes provisions regarding circumstances in which police must record a 
statement, exceptions to the recording requirements, what the recording 
must include, whether recording can be done without the suspect’s 
knowledge, and the consequences for failure to record.  
[6] Part I will survey the District of Columbia and those states that 
require the recording of custodial interrogations by statute. Part II will 
review states where a judicial decision created the requirement. Parts III 
and IV review those states that have created a recording requirement 
through a rule of evidence and by court rule. Finally, parts V and VI will 
conclude with a review of model legislation, as well as a review of 
proposed legislation in Michigan. 
I.  LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
A.  District of Columbia 
[7] The recording statute in the District of Columbia is generally 
straightforward and encompasses standard requirements found in many 
other jurisdictions.12 A unique consequence of the recording requirement 
is that the United States Attorney’s Office, which prosecutes local crimes 
committed in the District of Columbia, must adhere to the recording 
requirements when presenting cases in superior court.13 However, no such 
requirement exists when that office prosecutes federal crimes in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, because a federal recording 
requirement does not currently exist.14  
[8] The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) is required to record 
custodial interrogations when interrogating a person suspected of 
 
                                                                                                                         
12 D.C. CODE § 5-116.01 (2009). 
13 United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia: About Us, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/ About_Us/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). 
14 See generally infra note 211. 
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committing a crime of violence15 and when the interrogation takes place in 
a MPD interview room.16 In accordance with most other jurisdictions, the 
MPD must record the advice of rights and the suspect’s response.17 This is 
significant because it will have a substantial impact on litigation in which 
the adequacy of the advice of rights and the voluntariness of a subsequent 
waiver are in question.  
[9] If the suspect consents to questioning but does not want the 
interview recorded, the statute permits the police to stop recording.18 A 
statement obtained in violation of the statute results in a rebuttable 
presumption that the statement is involuntary.19 Legislation creating a 
presumption of involuntariness exists only in the District of Columbia and 
Illinois.20 Although the presumption is rebuttable, it creates a potential, yet 
 
                                                                                                                         
15 Section 23-1331(4) defines crime of violence as  
 aggravated assault; act of terrorism; arson; assault on a police 
officer (felony); assault with a dangerous weapon; assault with intent to 
kill, commit first degree sexual abuse, commit second degree sexual 
abuse, or commit child sexual abuse; assault with intent to commit any 
other offense; burglary; carjacking; armed carjacking; child sexual 
abuse; cruelty to children in the first degree; extortion or blackmail 
accompanied by threats of violence; gang recruitment, participation, or 
retention by the use or threatened use of force, coercion, or 
intimidation; kidnapping; malicious disfigurement; manslaughter; 
manufacture or possession of a weapon of mass destruction; mayhem; 
murder; robbery; sexual abuse in the first, second, or third degrees; use, 
dissemination, or detonation of a weapon of mass destruction; or an 
attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses. 
D.C. CODE § 23-1331(4). 
16 Id. § 5-116.01(a)(1). 
17 Id. § 5-116.01(b). 
18 Id. § 5-116.01(c)(1). 
19 Id. § 5-116.03. 
20 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(f) (2009). 
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substantial, barrier for the government, and it appears to be inconsistent 
with prevailing Supreme Court authority, as well as case law in the 
District of Columbia. Ordinarily, the government is only required to 
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant made a 
statement voluntarily.21 This statute increases the government’s burden of 
proof to “clear and convincing evidence.”22  
[10] The fact that the police did not record a confession does not mean 
that it was coerced. The Supreme Court, as well as decisions in the District 
of Columbia, has held that a statement is voluntary unless “the will of [the 
defendant] was ‘overborne in such a way as to render his confession the 
product of coercion.’”23 Moreover, this standard is inconsistent with the 
rule that, when ascertaining the voluntariness of a statement, the trier of 
fact must base the conclusion upon the totality of the circumstances, 
without giving presumptive weight to any single factor, such as a failure to 
record.24 
B.  Illinois 
[11] Illinois requires the recording of custodial interrogations of murder 
suspects when the questioning occurs in a detention facility, such as a 
police station or a jail.25 However, there is no specific requirement to 
 
                                                                                                                         
21 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). 
22 D.C. CODE § 5-116.03. 
23 United States v. Thomas, 595 A.2d 980, 981 (D.C. 1991) (quoting Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288 (1991)); see Davis v. United States, 724 A.2d 1163, 1168 
(D.C. 1998). 
24 The voluntariness of a confession is determined from “the totality of all the 
surrounding circumstances –[considering] both the characteristics of the accused and the 
details of the interrogation.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) 
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). By comparison, in 
Massachusetts a failure to record is a factor to be considered on the issue of 
voluntariness. Commonwealth v. DiGiamattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 529 (Mass. 2004). 
25 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(a)–(b) (West 2009) (“‘[C]ustodial interrogation’” 
means any interrogation during which (i) a reasonable person in the subject's position 
would consider himself or herself to be in custody and (ii) during which a question is 
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record the advice of a suspect’s rights or the suspect’s response.26 As will 
be discussed, most of the states require that the recording include the 
advice of rights. The latter requirement is sound policy because it will be 
easier for the parties to determine whether there has been compliance with 
Miranda.  
[12] Like many other jurisdictions, the Illinois statute provides 
numerous exceptions to the recording requirement.27 A non-recorded 
statement may be admissible if the prosecutor can prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence that an exception exists.28 These exceptions 
include, but are not limited to, situations where recording was not 
“feasible,”29 statements that bear on the credibility of the suspect as a 
witness,30 spontaneous statements by the accused not made in response to 
questioning,31 a suspect’s precondition that he will only make a statement 
if it were not recorded,32 and a statement made at a time the interrogator is 
 
                                                                                                                         
asked that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”). The statutory 
definition tracks United States Supreme Court authority. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 
U.S. 420, 442 (1984); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 292 (1980). It has been 
specifically held that the statute is not to be applied retroactively. People v. Amigon, 903 
N.E.2d 843, 848 (2009). 
26 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(e). 
27 See Id. 5/103-2.1(e). 
28 Id. 5/103-2.1(e)(ix). 
29 Id. 5/103-2.1(e)(ii). 
30 Id. 5/103-2.1(e)(iii). For example, a defendant could not successfully move to keep his 
statement out and subsequently be able to testify in a manner inconsistent with the 
statement given to the police. This is consistent with the Fifth Amendment impeachment 
jurisprudence where it has been held that the protections provided by Miranda cannot be 
used as a basis to commit perjury. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). 
31 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(e)(v). See generally Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 
582 (1990). 
32 Id. 5/103-2.1(e)(vi). 
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unaware that a death has occurred.33 Even if the state cannot establish the 
existence of an applicable exception, the statement may still be admissible 
if it can pass a due process voluntariness analysis.34  
[13] The penalties for failing to record are stricter in Illinois than in 
many of the other jurisdictions surveyed. If the court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the interrogation should have been 
recorded, the statute mandates that the statement “shall be presumed to be 
inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal proceeding . . 
. .”35 This includes not only the non-recorded statement made by the 
defendant, but also any statement made after the non-recorded statement, 
even if the subsequent interrogation complies with the statute.36 This 
presumption of inadmissibility may be overcome by a preponderance of 
evidence “that the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based 
upon a totality of circumstances.”37 If the statement is excluded, the only 
permissible use of the statement is for impeachment purposes.38 As noted, 
this is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. New 
York.39 
C.  Maine 
[14] In 2004, Maine enacted legislation requiring police agencies to 
create policies and procedures to deal with recording “interviews of 
 
                                                                                                                         
33 Id. 5/103-2.1(e)(viii). In People v. Armstrong, the court determined that this exception 
applies when “(1) a death has occurred; and (2) the interrogators are aware of the death.” 
919 N.E.2d 57, 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
34 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(f). 
35 Id. 5/103-2.1(b). 
36 Id. 5/103-2.1(d). 
37 Id. 5/103-2.1(f). This comports with the voluntariness requirement required under the 
Due Process Clause. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000). 
38 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(d). 
39 401 U.S. 222, 226 (2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(e)(iii). 
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suspects in serious crimes.”40 The Maine Chiefs of Police developed a 
model policy in February 2005.41 In 2006, the state mandated that all 
police agencies “[adopt] written policies” to deal with a number of 
specified law enforcement situations.42 
[15] Unlike other states, Maine’s statute is non-specific concerning 
issues such as whether electronic recording is required, what must be 
recorded (e.g. advice of rights) and what consequences, if any, exist for a 
failure to record.43 For example, there is no mandatory exclusion 
requirement or a provision for a cautionary jury instruction.44 The only 
 
                                                                                                                         
40 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B (2009). In State v. Buzzell, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine rejected the defendant’s argument that a failure to record violated due 
process. 617 A.2d 1016, 1018–19 (Me. 1992). It declined to follow Stephan v. State, 
where the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the due process clause of its state constitution 
required the recording of custodial interrogation when feasible. 711 P.2d 1156, 1159–60 
(Alaska 1985). 
41 The policy states:  
 This agency recognizes the importance of recording custodial 
interrogations related to serious crimes when they are conducted in a 
place of detention. A recorded custodial interrogation creates 
compelling evidence. A recording aids law enforcement efforts by 
confirming the content and the voluntariness of a confession, 
particularly when a person changes his testimony or claims falsely that 
his or her constitutional rights were violated. Confessions are important 
in that they often lead to convictions in cases that would otherwise be 
difficult to prosecute. Recording custodial interrogations is an 
important safeguard, and helps to protect the person’s right to counsel, 
the right against self-incrimination and, ultimately, the right to a fair 
trial. Finally, a recording of a custodial interrogation undeniably assists 
the trier of fact in ascertaining the truth. 
MAINE CHIEFS OF POLICE ASS’N, GENERAL ORDER, No.2-23A (2005), 
http://www.nacdl.org/sl_docs.nsf/freeform/MERI_attachments/$FILE/ME_Police_Recor
ding.pdf. 
42 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B(3). 
43 See id. §§ 2803-B, C. 
44 See generally § 2803-B. 
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consequence is a relatively minor civil penalty incurred by the police 
agency that failed to record.45 Also, there are no specified exceptions to 
the recording requirement that appear in other states, such as statements 
made during routine booking questions, spontaneous statements, and 
inoperable equipment.46 It would seem that each police agency has 
substantial latitude to develop its own standards. Among the states 
surveyed, Maine’s provisions are among the least stringent regarding 
requirements and consequences. 
D.  Missouri 
[16] Interestingly, passage of the Missouri statute is largely due to a 
committee of prosecutors and law enforcement officials who, concerned 
about the potential sanctions for non-recording as seen in other 
jurisdictions, decided to be proactive and preempt any legislative or court 
action by drafting legislation.47 This committee, while recognizing the 
importance of recording interrogations, feared that a failure to act could 
result in either the legislature or a state court creating an exclusionary rule 
similar to ones found in other jurisdictions.48 In Missouri, there are no 
significant penalties for failing to record a custodial interrogation.49  
[17] Missouri requires that a member of law enforcement electronically 
record the questioning of a person suspected of committing certain serious 
offenses (such as murder, rape, and kidnapping), under circumstances 
 
                                                                                                                         
45 Id. § 2803-C. 
46 See generally id. § 2803-B. 
47 See generally Eric G. Zahnd, Missouri’s Experience With Recorded Interrogation 
Legislation: Prosecutors Lead Effort to Pass Sensible Law, 43 PROSECUTOR 36 (2009). 
48 Id. at 38 (discussing rules about the potential exclusion of non-recorded statements 
found in Alaska, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, Texas and 
Washington, D.C.). 
49 See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 590.700(5)–(7) (2009). 
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traditionally defined as “custodial interrogation.”50 Missouri law also 
provides for situations in which law enforcement is not required to record 
an interrogation, including a request by the suspect not to record the 
interrogation, spontaneous statements, equipment failure, and 
emergencies.51 In addition, the statute requires that every police agency 
create a written policy regarding the recording of such interrogations.52 
[18] In Missouri, the statute specifically provides that a failure to 
comply with the provisions does not constitute grounds for suppression.53 
Moreover, a failure to comply may not be used as evidence during a 
criminal trial.54 The only penalty provided in the statute allows the 
governor to withhold funds earmarked for the non-compliant agency, if 
the agency failed to act in good faith in its non-compliance.55 In State v. 
Blair, the Missouri Court of Appeals first rejected the defendant’s 
argument that a failure to record is a due process violation. 56 The court 
referred to the pending Missouri statute, and observed that “this new 
statute would not provide future defendants” a suppression remedy where 
there has been a failure to record under circumstances requiring it.57 
Therefore, the committee’s action appeared to have had the impact it 
intended. 
 
                                                                                                                         
50 MO. REV. STAT. § 590.700(1) (defining custodial interrogation as “the questioning of a 
person under arrest, who is no longer at the scene of the crime, by a member of a law 
enforcement agency along with the answers and other statements of the person 
questioned.”).  
51 Id. § 590.700(3). 
52 Id. § 590.700(4).  
53 Id. § 590.700(6). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. § 590.700(5). 
56 298 S.W.3d 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(e)(viii) 
(West 2009). 
57 Blair, 298 S.W.3d at 51–52. 
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E.  Montana 
[19] Montana requires the electronic recording of all custodial 
interrogations for felony offenses.58 The recording must include the advice 
of rights.59 Moreover, as with most of the state statutes, there exist a 
number of exceptions.60 The list is fairly typical and consistent with the 
exceptions in other states. However, there is a significant escape hatch, 
which allows for the admission of the statement if the prosecution can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “the statements have 
been made voluntarily and are reliable . . . .”61 Thus, if the interrogation 
passes muster under the traditional tests of voluntariness and is otherwise 
reliable, the trial court shall admit it even though there is no recording.62 
However, even under these circumstances, the judge is required to give the 
jury a cautionary instruction regarding the failure of the police to record 
the interrogation, if requested by the defendant to do so.63 
F.  Nebraska 
[20] Nebraska requires the electronic recording of custodial 
interrogations regarding certain designated felonies, such as sexual assault, 
kidnapping, and child abuse.64 Nebraska defines “custodial interrogation” 
in a manner that specifically tracks the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of 
the United States Constitution, U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and similar 
 
                                                                                                                         
58 MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 46-4-407 to 46-4-408 (2009). The statute states that “all 
custodial interrogations must be electronically recorded.” Id. § 46-4-408. However, 
“custodial interrogation” is defined as “an interview conducted by a peace officer in a 
place of detention for the purpose of investigating a felony . . . .” Id. § 46-4-407. 
59 Id. § 46-4-408. 
60 Id. § 46-4-409. 
61 Id. § 46-4-409(1). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. §§ 46-4-408, 46-4-410. 
64 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4503(2) (2009). 
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provisions of the Nebraska Constitution.65 Other provisions, including the 
definitions for “electronically record” and “place of detention,” as well as 
the exceptions to the recording requirements, are similar to those found in 
many of the other jurisdictions.66 The law requires the recording of the 
advice of rights and the waiver (if one is obtained), as do many of the 
other jurisdictions surveyed in this Article.67  
[21] Nebraska significantly differs from other jurisdictions in that a 
failure to comply with the requirements of the statute requires the trial 
court to “instruct the jury that they may draw an adverse inference for the 
law enforcement officer’s failure to comply with such section.”68 
[22] However, even if law enforcement personnel fail to record the 
statement, the court may permit its use for impeachment purposes if the 
statement was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given.69 A jury 
instruction is not required if the prosecution establishes by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a “reasonable exception” existed for 
not recording the statement.70 Finally, consistent with Miranda 
jurisprudence, there is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” application as it 
 
                                                                                                                         
65 Id. § 29-4502(1). 
66 Id. §§ 29-4502(2)–(4) (defining “electronically record” to mean “to record using an 
audio recording device, a digital recording device, or a video recording device” and 
defining a “place of detention” as “a police station, sheriff's office, troop headquarters, 
courthouse, county attorney's office, juvenile or adult correctional or holding facility, 
community correctional center, or building under the permanent control of law 
enforcement at which the person is in custody pursuant to the authority of a law 
enforcement officer.” Id. §§ 29-4502(2)–(3)). 
67 Id. § 29-4501. 
68 Id. § 29-4504. 
69 Id. § 29-4504(1). 
70 Id. § 29-4505(2). 
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relates to derivative evidence, if the subsequently obtained evidence is 
otherwise admissible.71 
G.  New Mexico 
[23] New Mexico law is broad in application because it only requires 
the electronic recording of custodial interrogations “when reasonably able 
to do so” and only when “the person is suspected of committing a felony 
offense.”72 Thus, law enforcement appears to have some flexibility in 
determining whether to record. Consistent with the requirements in other 
jurisdictions, law enforcement agencies are required to record the 
complete custodial interrogation, beginning with the advice of rights.73 
“Custodial interrogation” includes circumstances in which Miranda 
warnings are necessary.74 Although recording is mandatory, a police 
officer’s failure to comply can be excusable if “good cause” existed and 
the officer created a “contemporaneous written or electronic record” 
specifying the reasons for not recording.75 Additionally, there are no 
penalty provisions for failure to record.76 In fact, the final section of the 
statute provides that “this section shall not be construed to exclude 
otherwise admissible evidence in any judicial proceeding.”77 
 
                                                                                                                         
71 See id. § 29-4506; see also United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 635–44 (2004); 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 301–05 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 
(1974). 
72 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-16(A), (D) (West 2009). 
73 Id. §§ 29-1-16(A)(1), (3). 
74 See id. § 29-1-16(H). 
75 Id. § 29-1-16(B) (stating examples of good cause including situations when the 
equipment was unavailable, where the equipment failed and replacement equipment was 
not available, or when the suspect refused to be recorded). 
76 See generally id. § 29-1-16. 
77 Id. § 29-1-16(I). 
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H.  North Carolina 
[24] In North Carolina, all police departments are required to 
electronically record custodial interrogations pertaining to homicide 
investigations.78 A unique feature of the North Carolina statute is the 
requirement that the recording device capture both the suspect and the 
interrogator.79 This statutory requirement would appear to be a reflection 
of studies that demonstrate that it is important to position the camera on 
both participants.80 The result is a more fair and objective evaluation of 
the voluntariness of the interview. This is important because a failure to 
capture the interrogator may lend itself to allegations by the defendant that 
the interrogator intimidated him through off-camera gestures and facial 
expressions.81 
[25] The enumerated exceptions are generally consistent with those 
found in other jurisdictions. They include spontaneous statements, 
statements made during routine questions asked during the processing of a 
suspect, statements made in open court, and statements made when the 
police are not cognizant that the person interviewed is not a murder 
suspect.82 Finally, consistent with most other jurisdictions, the police 
department must keep the recording for one year after the exhaustion of all 
appeals, including habeas corpus proceedings.83 
 
                                                                                                                         
78 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-211(d) (2009). 
79 Id. § 15A-211(c)(2). 
80 See Evelyn Mahoney, Interrogations, Confessions, and Videotape, 14 J. Politics & 
Society, 117, 123 (2003), available at http://www.helvidius.org/files/2003/2003_ 
Mahony.pdf (citing G. Daniel Lassiter, et al., Videotaped Confessions: Is Guilt in the Eye 
of the Camera?, 33 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 189–254 (2001)); see also 
William Geller, Nat’l Inst. of Justice Research in Brief, Videotaping Interrogations and 
Confessions (Mar. 1993) (on file with author). 
81 Mahoney, supra note 80, at 123; see Geller, supra note 80. 
82 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-211(g). 
83 Id. § 15A-211(h). 
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[26] A failure by law enforcement to record the entire interrogation 
does not preclude admissibility of a subsequent recorded portion of the 
interrogation; rather, this later recorded statement is open to a challenge as 
to its voluntariness and reliability.84 In such circumstances, the prosecutor 
has the burden of establishing by “clear and convincing evidence that the 
statement was both voluntary and reliable and that law enforcement 
officers had good cause for failing to electronically record the 
interrogation in its entirety.”85 Good cause includes the recorded refusal 
by the suspect to have the statement recorded and unforeseen equipment 
failure.86 
[27] If the state fails to record as required by the statute, the court is 
required to consider this in connection with a motion to suppress.87 In 
addition, upon a challenge of the interrogation, the court must consider the 
failure to record as being involuntary or unreliable.88 Finally, the court 
must instruct the jury that the failure of the police to record the 
interrogation is a factor they may consider regarding whether the 
statement was voluntary.89 
I.  Oregon 
[28] Oregon’s statute becomes effective in two stages.90 As of July 1, 
2010, recording is required for all custodial interrogations resulting from 
 
                                                                                                                         
84 Id. § 15A-211(e). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. §§ 15A-211(e)(1)–(2). 
87 Id. § 15A-211(f)(1). 
88 Id. § 15A-211(f)(2). 
89 Id. § 15A-211(f)(3). 
90 See 2009 OR. LAWS ch.488 (relating to custodial interrogations; creating new 
provisions and amending OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540) (adopted June 24, 2009). 
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certain offenses, such as aggravated murder.91 On July 1, 2011, the statute 
will extend the recording requirement to include all major felonies that 
carry a mandatory minimum sentence.92 The statute does seem to require 
that the recording include the advice of rights.93 
[29] Oregon’s law contains many of the same exceptions found in other 
states’ statutes. Some examples are: statements made during routine 
booking questions, spontaneous statements, statements provided to federal 
law enforcement, and equipment failure.94 In what appears to be a unique 
exception, the statute does not apply to an “agency that employs five or 
fewer peace officers.”95 This exception is likely meant to relieve smaller 
agencies of the costs associated with purchasing the recording equipment 
and constructing the appropriate facilities.  
[30] The Oregon statute prohibits courts from excluding a defendant’s 
statement or dismissing criminal charges in spite of a violation of the 
recording requirements.96 However, if the state cannot show by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of an enumerated exception 
to the recording requirement, the court upon Defendant’s request “shall 
instruct the jury regarding the legal requirement described in subsection 
(1) . . . and the superior reliability of electronic recordings . . . .”97 
Conversely, if the state records the statement, “the court may not give a 
cautionary jury instruction.”98 
 
                                                                                                                         
91 Id. 
92 Id.  
93 See id. § 1(6).  
94 Id. §§ 1(2)(a)–(i), (7).  
95 Id. § 1(2)(g).  
96 Id. § 1(3)(b). 
97 Id. § 1(3)(a).  
98 Id. § 1(3)(c) (emphasis added).  
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J.  Texas 
[31] Under Texas law, “no oral or sign language statement of an 
accused made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible 
against the accused in a criminal proceeding unless: (1) an electronic 
recording . . . is made of the statement.”99 As with several other states, 
such as Nebraska, authorities must record their efforts to advise an 
individual of his rights and the individual’s waiver of those rights.100 
However, as with virtually every other jurisdiction mandating electronic 
recording of custodial interrogations, there is no requirement to record 
conversations with the police that occurred prior to a defendant’s final 
statement.101 The occurrence of a prior, unrecorded conversation may be 
important information for a judge, if asked to consider a possible Fifth 
Amendment violation, and a jury, since it is essential to view the final 
recorded statement in the context of what may have previously occurred. 
Additionally, signed written statements do not fall within the statute 
because the statute is limited to “oral or sign language statement[s].”102 
[32] Interestingly, the statute also provides the following unique 
exception to the recording requirement: 
 Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any 
statement which contains assertions of facts or 
circumstances that are found to be true and which conduce 
to establish the guilt of the accused, such as the finding of 
secreted or stolen property or the instrument with which he 
states the offense was committed.103 
 
                                                                                                                         
99 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 §§ 3(a)–3(a)(1) (Vernon 2001). 
100 Id. § 3(a)(2); see supra Part II.F.  
101 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3. 
102 Id. § 3(a); see GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT O. DAWSON, 41 TEX. CRIM. PRAC. & PROC. § 
13.161 (2d ed. 2001). 
103 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3(c). 
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Thus, if a murder suspect, while subject to police questioning, states that 
he left the murder weapon at an elementary school playground, the 
statement is admissible if the weapon was later found as a direct result of 
the suspect’s statement. Furthermore, the statement is admissible even if 
law enforcement did not electronically record it, as required. In Robertson 
v. State, the defendant claimed that his statement, taken while in police 
custody, did not comply with Texas law because the police did not advise 
him of his right to terminate the interview at any time.104 The suspect told 
the police about his involvement in the robbery, disclosed that he had used 
a stolen .38 caliber revolver and revealed where he had hidden the 
weapon.105 Pursuant to the suspect’s statement, police found the gun.106 
The court held that “[b]ecause the confession contains assertions of facts 
which were found to be true and which help establish the appellant’s guilt, 
the confession [is] admissible . . . .”107 
[33] Another unique feature of the statute concerns the use of an 
electronically recorded statement as part of a proceeding. The statute 
dictates that if an individual untruthfully testifies regarding the facts and 
circumstances concerning the recording, he “is presumed to have acted 
with intent to deceive” and is subject to a perjury prosecution.108  
[34] Texas law is generally consistent with other states as it relates to 
those situations in which an electronic recording is not required (e.g., 
 
                                                                                                                         
104 871 S.W.2d 701, 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 
105 Id. at 714. 
106 Id. 
107 Id.; see also Sendejo v. State, 953 S.W. 2d 443, 448–49 (Tex. App. 1997) (finding that 
the defendant’s statements made to a police officer while in custody constituted facts 
later found to be true and were therefore admissible under the statute); Romero v. State, 
800 S.W. 2d 539, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (finding that the defendant’s oral 
confession made to police while in custody did not contain facts later found to be true and 
was therefore inadmissible under the statute). 
108 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 4. 
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voluntary statement).109 Except as noted above, a failure by law 
enforcement personnel to adhere to the electronic recording requirements 
bars the admission of a statement, unless one of the enunciated exceptions 
applies.110 Unlike other jurisdictions, which either have no penalty for a 
failure to comply (Missouri)111 or require the giving of an adverse jury 
instruction (Nebraska),112 Texas law provides that if the requirements are 
not met, “no oral or sign language statement of an accused made as a 
result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the accused 
. . . .”113  
K.  Wisconsin 
[35] Wisconsin law requires the recording of custodial interrogation for 
all felonies.114 There is no requirement to inform the suspect that the 
police are recording his statement.115 The statutory exceptions are 
generally consistent with those found in other states (e.g., routine 
processing questions, spontaneous statements, equipment failure, exigent 
circumstances, etc.).116 
[36] If the police failed to make a recording as required by the statute 
and the state fails to establish good cause for such failure upon request by 
the defendant, the court is required to instruct the jury that the state’s 
policy is to make an audio or visual recording of a custodial 
 
                                                                                                                         
109 Id. § 5. 
110 See id. § 3. 
111 See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
112 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
113 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 3(a) (emphasis added). 
114 WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.073, 972.115 (West 2009). 
115 Id. § 968.073(3). 
116 Id. §§ 972.115(2)(a)(1)–(6). 
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interrogation.117 The court will further instruct the jury that it “may 
consider the absence of an audio or audio and visual recording of the 
interrogation in evaluating the evidence relating to the interrogation and 
the statement in the case.”118  
[37] In several federal prosecutions, the defendants sought to challenge 
the admissibility of their post-arrest statements because law enforcement, 
including state officers, failed to record their statements as required by 
state law.119 The court rejected their arguments in each instance because 
there is no federal law enforcement counterpart to Wisconsin’s mandatory 
recording provisions.120 
II.  JUDICIAL MANDATE 
A.  Alaska 
[38] In the 1980 case of Mallot v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court 
instructed law enforcement officials that “as part of their duty to preserve 
evidence,121 it is incumbent upon them to tape record, where feasible, any 
questioning and particularly that which occurs in a place of detention.”122 
In 1985, the court mandated statewide recording of custodial 
interrogations.123 In Stephan v. State, two defendants, Harris and Stephan, 
 
                                                                                                                         
117 Id. § 972.115(2)(a). 
118 Id. 
119 See generally United States v. Bruce, 550 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Wilderness, 160 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Delaporte, 42 F.3d 1118 (7th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Haeuser, No. 08-CR-56, 2008 WL 4642250 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 
17, 2008). 
120 Bruce, 550 F.3d at 671–73; Haeuser, 2008 WL 4642250, at *10; see Wilderness, 160 
F.3d at 1175–76; Delaporte, 42 F.3d at 1119–20. 
121 Mallot v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 743 n.5 (Alaska 1980) (citing Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d 
553, 558 n.5 (Alaska 1978)). 
122 Id. (citing UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 243(b)). 
123 Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 1985). 
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were arrested on unrelated charges and interrogated by police officers at 
the stationhouse.124 Harris was questioned twice and Stephan once.125 
Both made inculpatory statements.126 In each case, the police had 
recording equipment present, that they used during a portion of the 
interviews.127 The officers were unable to offer adequate explanations for 
their failure to record the interrogations in their entirety.128  
[39] Both defendants moved to suppress their statements prior to trial 
and, as is usually the case, there were disputes between the police and the 
defendants as to what occurred in the interrogation rooms.129 In both 
cases, the Alaska Court of Appeals found a violation of the Mallot rule but 
rejected the application of an exclusionary rule.130 In Stephan, the court 
acknowledged that, based upon prior decisions, there was uncertainty 
regarding what should be the proper remedy when there is a failure to 
record.131 Additionally, the Stephan court decided that “an unexcused 
failure to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a 
place of detention violates a suspect’s right to due process under the 
Alaska Constitution, and that any statement thus obtained is generally 
inadmissible.”132 The recording must include the advice of rights.133 This 
 
                                                                                                                         
124 Id. at 1158. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. One officer testified that it was “normal practice” to first obtain a statement and 
then record the confession. Id. at n.3. 
129 Id. at 1158. 
130 Id. at 1159. 
131 See id. at 1163. 
132 Id. at 1158.  
133 Id. at 1162. 
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recording requirement is necessary to help ensure the suspect’s right to 
counsel, to protect against self-incrimination, and to protect the right to a 
fair trial.134 This requirement only applies where the interrogation is 
“conducted in a place of detention, such as a police station . . ., where it is 
reasonable to assume that recording equipment is available . . . .”135 The 
court issued a warning that it may extend the requirement of recording to 
other venues if it finds that law enforcement is conducting interviews in a 
manner designed to circumvent the requirement.136 
[40] The court went on to hold that the exclusionary rule would apply 
“only if the failure is unexcused.”137 It recognized that it cannot provide an 
exhaustive list of excusable circumstances but does provide several 
examples, including equipment failure and a suspect’s refusal to answer 
questions once informed the police would be recording the 
interrogation.138 As such, the trial court is to consider each circumstance 
where the police did not record the interrogation.139 The state will be 
required to satisfy the court pursuant to a preponderance of evidence 
standard as to why the failure of the police to record is excusable.140 
[41] Finally, the court observed that rigid application of the 
exclusionary rule, when there has been a violation of the recording rule, 
would be unreasonable.141 Failure to record a portion of the interrogation 
does not necessarily bar the use of the suspect’s recorded statements “if 
 
                                                                                                                         
134 Id. at 1164. 
135 Id. at 1165 n.33 (emphasis removed). 
136 Id. (emphasis removed). 
137 Id. at 1162 (emphasis in original). 
138 Id. 
139 See id. 
140 Id. 
141
 See id. at 1165 
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the unrecorded portion of the interrogation is, by all accounts, 
innocuous.”142 For example, police officers may obtain statements, only 
portions of which are recorded, before a violation actually occurs. The full 
unrecorded statement is admissible despite a violation of the rule if there is 
no evidence “that the statement is inaccurate or was otherwise obtained 
improperly . . . .”143 
B.  Iowa 
[42] Iowa encourages, but does not require, the police to record 
custodial interrogations.144 In Hajtic, the court considered whether a 
seventeen-year-old suspect made his confession voluntarily, knowingly, 
and intelligently.145 His fourteen-year-old sister translated conversations 
between the defendant’s mother and the police.146 Iowa’s juvenile laws 
required that a parent consent to the juvenile’s waiver of Miranda 
rights.147 
[43] The court observed that the recording of the defendant’s 
confessions assisted in the voluntariness determination.148 The court noted 
that “[t]his case illustrates the value of electronic recording, particularly 
videotaping, of custodial interrogations.”149 The court added that “the 
videotape of Hajtic’s confession and the Miranda warnings that preceded 
 
                                                                                                                         
142
 Id. (emphasis in original).     
143 Id. 
144 State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 456 (Iowa 2006). 
145 See id. at 451–52. 
146 Id. 
147 IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11(2) (West 2010). 
148 See Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d at 454. 
149 Id. 
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it clearly show that he understood the Miranda warnings given to him and 
the questions asked.”150 
[44] The Alaska Supreme Court’s adoption of an exclusionary rule and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s mandate of electronic recording pursuant 
to its supervisory powers significantly influenced the court’s decision.151 
In addition, the Hajtic court cited the ABA provisions endorsing electronic 
recording.152 
C.  Massachusetts 
[45] Although Massachusetts does not require the police to 
electronically record custodial interrogations, the state’s highest court 
 
                                                                                                                         
150 Id. at 456. 
151 See id. at 454–55 (citing Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Alaska 1985); State v. 
Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994)). 
152 724 N.W.2d at 456. The ABA policy provides: 
RESOLVED, That the American bar Association urges all law 
enforcement agencies to videotape the entirety of custodial 
interrogations of crime suspects at police precincts, courthouses, 
detention centers, or other places where suspects are held for 
questioning, or where videotaping is impractical, to audiotape the 
entirety of such custodial interrogations. 
FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association 
urges legislatures and/or courts to enact laws or rules of procedure 
requiring videotaping of the entirety of custodial interrogations of 
crime suspects at police precincts, courthouses, or other places where 
suspects are held for questioning, or, where videotaping is impractical, 
to require the audiotaping of such custodial interrogations, and to 
provide appropriate remedies for non-compliance. 
Id. (quoting N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS’ ASSOC. AM. BAR ASS’N REPORT TO THE HOUSE 
DELEGATES 1 (2004), http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2004/recommendations/8a.pdf). 
The current ABA policy is available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/midyear/ 
recommendations/108.pdf. 
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exacts a penalty when the police fail to do so.153 In Commonwealth v. 
DiGiambattista, the court held that, under the totality of circumstances, 
the defendant’s confession to arson was not voluntary.154 In particular, the 
court was concerned about the interrogator’s use of trickery, implied 
offers of leniency, and minimization.155 The court held that where the 
police could have recorded the confession and failed to do so, the 
defendant may request a jury instruction indicating that a failure to record 
may be considered in determining whether the state has met its burden of 
establishing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.156 
[46] Despite its clear preference for recording, the court declined to 
impose a “rule of exclusion,” given the existence of differing 
circumstances and problems.157 The court cited several possible situations, 
including non-custodial interrogations conducted at a police station and 
non-custodial interrogations that turn into custodial interrogations.158 In 
addition, any recording requirement would have to allow for justifiable 
failures to record, as well as a situation in which the suspect insists that as 
 
                                                                                                                         
153 Commonwealth v. Diaz, 661 N.E. 2d 1326, 1328 (Mass. 1996). 
154 813 N.E.2d 516, 528; see also SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 6 n.11. See generally 
Commonwealth v. Dagley, 816 N.E.2d 527 (Mass. 2004). Following this ruling, the state 
Attorney General and District Attorneys Ass'n wrote in a Sept. 2006 Justice Initiative 
Report: “Law enforcement officers shall, whenever it is practical and with the suspect’s 
knowledge, electronically record all custodial interrogations of suspects and 
interrogations of suspects conducted in places of detention.” 
155 See DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d at 523. 
156 Id. at 518 (“[T]he admission in evidence of any confession or statement of the 
defendant that is the product of an unrecorded custodial confession, or an unrecorded 
interrogation conducted at a place of detention, will entitle the defendant, on request, to a 
jury instruction concerning the need to evaluate the alleged statement or confession with 
particular caution.”). 
157 See id. at 534. 
158 Id. at 532. 
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a precondition to an interview, he does not want the police to record his 
interrogation.159 
D.  Minnesota 
[47] In Minnesota v. Scales, the state’s highest court considered 
whether a defendant had a due process right to have his complete custodial 
interrogation recorded under the Minnesota Constitution.160 As an 
alternative route, the court evaluated whether it could issue a mandate 
requiring recordation based upon its supervisory powers.161 As part of its 
analysis, the court reiterated its clear preference that recording a suspect’s 
statements to the police would substantially aid lower courts in resolving 
what took place in the interrogation room.162 The failure of law 
enforcement to do so troubled the court.163 
[48] Despite the court’s clear predilection and earlier warnings, the 
police in Scales interrogated the defendant, who was a suspect in a 
murder, for approximately three hours and did not record it.164 Thereafter, 
the interrogation continued, but in a more formal question and answer 
session.165 Police recorded the second interrogation.166 Before trial, the 
 
                                                                                                                         
159 Id. The last two circumstances consistently appear as justifiable excuses for a failure 
to record. 
160 518 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Minn. 1994). 
161 Id.  
162 See id. at 591. 
163 See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 224 n.5 (Minn. 1988). In State v. 
Pilcher, the court “urge[d] . . . law enforcement professionals [to] use those technological 
means at their disposal to fully preserve those conversations and events preceding the 
actual interrogation.” 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991). A failure to do so would cause 
the court to “look with great disfavor upon any further refusal to heed these 
admonitions.” Id. 
164 State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 590 (Minn. 1994). 
165 Id. 
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defendant challenged the truthfulness of the officers’ testimony, as well as 
the adequacy of his Miranda warnings and his ensuing waiver.167 The trial 
court rejected his argument and declined to rule whether the failure to 
record was a violation of the state’s Constitution.168 
[49] In deciding that recording a suspect’s statement is required, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court looked favorably upon the Alaska Supreme 
Court’s decision in Stephan v. State, which held that the failure by the 
police to record a suspect’s custodial interrogation was a due process 
violation under the state Constitution.169 
E.  New Hampshire 
[50] In State v. Barnett, the defendant’s interrogation was in connection 
with a sexual assault.170 However, police only recorded a portion of the 
interrogation.171 Initially, the defendant denied molesting the young girls, 
but after forty-five minutes, he admitted to the assault.172 Thereafter, the 
defendant agreed to repeat his admissions for recording purposes.173 On 
appeal, he claimed the trial court erred in admitting the recorded 
 
                                                                                                                         
166 Id. at 590. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 The court also cited the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §130.4(3) and the 
Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure, both of which require the recording of custodial 
interrogations conducted at detention facilities. Id. at 591–92 (stating that the Court 
“chooses not to determine at this time whether under the Due Process Clause of the 
Minnesota Constitution a criminal suspect has a right to have his or her custodial 
interrogation recorded,” but requiring that all such questioning to be electronically 
recorded); see Stephan, supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
170 789 A.2d 629, 630 (N.H. 2001). 
171 Id. at 631. 
172 Id. at 630–31. 
173 Id. at 631. 
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interrogation because it did not include his prior exculpatory statements.174 
He argued that this was a violation of his due process rights under both the 
New Hampshire and the federal Constitution.175 
[51] The Supreme Court of New Hampshire disagreed.176 The court 
began its analysis by looking at two other states that considered this issue. 
The only state to require recordation of custodial interrogations as a due 
process right is Alaska.177 The court declined to follow Alaska’s path and 
instead looked to the Minnesota line of reasoning, where that court held 
that a suspect possesses no due process right under the Minnesota 
Constitution to have his or her custodial interrogation recorded.178 
Consequently, the New Hampshire court invoked its supervisory powers 
by requiring recordation of all custodial interrogations.179 The state’s 
failure to do so results in the inadmissibility of the recording of the 
interrogation.180  
[52] The Barnett court carved out a decision that cuts between these 
two states. Initially, it held that the advice of rights and waiver need not be 
recorded.181 In addition, the police are not required to record all custodial 
interrogations.182 Rather, it held that if law enforcement decides to record 
 
                                                                                                                         
174 Id. 
175 Id.  
176 Id. at 632. 
177 Id. at 631–32; see Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 1985). 
178 Barnett, 789 A.2d at 632; see Minnesota v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 
1994).  
179 Barnett, 789 A.2d at 632–33. 
180 Id.  
181 Id. at 632. 
182
 Id. 
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a suspect’s interrogation, it must record the complete interrogation.183 The 
penalty for failing to do so is the exclusion of the entire recorded 
statement.184 However, unlike the rules in Alaska and Minnesota, “where 
the incomplete recording of an interrogation results in the exclusion of the 
tape recording itself, evidence gathered during the interrogation may still 
be admitted in alternate forms, subject to the usual rules of evidence.”185 
Thus, presumably, while the state would be prohibited from introducing a 
partially recorded interrogation, the prosecution could still have the officer 
testify as to what the defendant said in the interrogation room being a non-
hearsay statement.186 
III.  RULE OF EVIDENCE 
[53] Indiana’s recording rule requires that law enforcement 
electronically record custodial interrogations for all felonies.187 However, 
this requirement came about through an order of the Indiana Supreme 
Court amending Rule of Evidence 617.188 Rule 617 requires recordation of 
all custodial interrogations occurring in a place of detention, unless there 
is the existence of an enumerated exception.189 The Rule tracks the 
 
                                                                                                                         
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 632–33. 
185 Id. 
186 See N.H. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (2009). 
187 IND. R. EVID. 617 (effective Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.in.gov/ilea/files/Evidence_ 
Rule_617.pdf.  
188 RANDALL T. SHEPARD, CHIEF JUSTICE OF IND., ORDER AMENDING RULES OF 
EVIDENCE, No. 94S00-0909-MS-4 (2009), http://www.in.gov/ilea/files/Evidence_ 
Rule_617.pdf. Pursuant to the request of the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office and the 
Indiana Metropolitan Police Department the rule “shall only apply to statements made on 
or after January 1, 2011. Id. 
189 IND. R. EVID. 617(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.in.gov/ilea/files/Evidence_ 
Rule_617.pdf.  
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traditional definitions of “electronic recording,” “custodial interrogation,” 
and “place of detention.”190 
[54] The failure to record results in suppression of the statement, unless 
the prosecutor can establish by clear and convincing evidence the 
existence of an enumerated exception.191 The exceptions are those 
typically found in the other jurisdictions and include statements made 
during booking, a suspect who agrees to answer questions only if there is 
no recording, malfunctioning equipment where there is no bad faith, and 
spontaneous utterances.192 In addition, recording is not required where the 
officer reasonably believes that the suspect’s questioning is in regards to 
non-felonious conduct.193 The Rule does allow for non-recording where 
there exists “substantial exigent circumstances.”194 There are no examples 
of substantial exigent circumstances provided by the Rule.195 
IV.  COURT RULE 
A.  Maryland 
[55] Maryland’s requirements are very limited and are contained in its 
criminal procedure code.196 The statute merely provides that where a law 
enforcement unit maintains rooms capable of electronic recording, they 
should make “reasonable efforts” to record custodial interrogations in 
cases involving murder, rape, and certain sexual offenses.197 It is 
 
                                                                                                                         
190 Id. at 617(b). 
191 Id. at 617(a). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 617(a)(5). 
194 Id. at 617(a)(7). 
195 See id. 
196 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-402 (West 2009). 
197 Id. 
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essentially a policy statement; none of the requirements or consequences 
found in many of the other statutes exists. For example, there are no 
penalties or consequences if the police fail to record a murder suspect’s 
custodial interrogation.198 
B.  New Jersey 
[56] In 2005, New Jersey adopted a court rule that requires the 
recording of all custodial interrogations in a place of detention.199 The 
court rule is generally consistent with the statutory requirements 
promulgated in other states. For example, it is limited to enumerated 
felonies such as murder, kidnapping, and criminal sexual contact.200 In 
addition, the exceptions are similar to those found in other jurisdictions.201 
They include routine questioning, spontaneous utterances, a suspect’s 
requirement that he will only answer questions absent a recording, and 
interrogations conducted out-of-state.202 The state has the burden of 
establishing by a “preponderance of the evidence” the existence of an 
exception.203 These enumerated exceptions include circumstances where 
the suspect is being interviewed for an offense that does not require 
recordation and situations where the police are unaware the individual 
being interviewed has committed an offense that requires recordation. 204 
[57] Procedurally, the state has the burden of establishing an exception 
by a “preponderance of the evidence” if it intends to use an unrecorded 
 
                                                                                                                         
198 See id. 
199 N.J. CT. R. 3.17. 
200 Id. at 3.17(a). 
201 Id. at 3.17(b); see, e.g., supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
202 N.J. CT. R. at 3.17(b)(i)–(vii). 
203 Id. at 3.17(b). 
204 Id. at 3.17(b)(vi)–(vii). 
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statement.205 The state also must file a “notice of intent” specifying when 
and where the unrecorded statement occurred and which applicable 
exception(s) it is relying upon.206 Additionally, if requested by the 
defendant, the state must provide the names and addresses of the witnesses 
it intends to call to establish one of the specified exceptions.207 
[58] The penalty for the failure to follow the rule is not necessarily 
suppression of the statement.208 Rather, it is only a factor for the court to 
take into consideration in determining the admissibility of the statement, 
an issue for the jury as to whether the defendant made the statement, and 
what weight, if any, to give to the statement.209 If a statement should have 
been recorded, the defendant may request a cautionary instruction, which 
the court is obligated to give.210 
V.  MODEL LEGISLATION 
A.  National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
[59] The Electronic Recordation of Custodial Interrogations Act 
(“Act”) requires the electronic recording of the entire custodial 
interrogation, including the advice of rights.211 The Act requires the 
recording of any “statement” made in response to police interrogation.212 
 
                                                                                                                         
205 Id. at 3.17(a)–(b). 
206 Id. at 3.17(c). 
207 Id. 
208 See id. at 3.17(d). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 3.17(e). 
211 NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, ELECTRONIC RECORDATION 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION ACT § 3(a) (2009) (Interim Draft), 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/erci/2009nov_interim.pdf. 
212 See id. § 2(1). 
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The Act defines “statement” broadly, including both oral and written 
statements.213 There is no requirement that the suspect know that the 
police are recording her statement.214 Many of the specified exceptions are 
similar to those found in the jurisdictions previously summarized (e.g. 
exigent circumstances, spontaneous statements, routine booking questions, 
a refusal by the suspect to allow police to record the statement, and 
equipment malfunction).215  
[60] If interrogation occurs for an offense not covered by the Act, no 
recording is required.216 However, if during the questioning there is reason 
to believe the responses by the suspect relate to a covered offense, the 
officer should try to record the covered statements.217 If the state intends 
to rely on a covered exception, it must demonstrate by a “preponderance 
of the evidence” why the police failed to record the statement.218 In 
addition, if the police failed to make a recording in circumstances where 
they should have, the law enforcement officer may prepare a report 
explaining his or her reasons.219 The state must provide the defendant with 
notice if it intends to rely upon a recognized exception for not recording 
the statement.220 
[61] There are various remedies for a failure to record when the state 
has failed to satisfy its burden regarding an applicable exception.221 The 
 
                                                                                                                         
213 Id. § 2(6). 
214 Id. § 3(c). 
215 Id. §§ 4–9. 
216 Id. § 8(1). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. § 10. 
219 Id. § 11(a). 
220 Id. § 12(a). 
221 Id. § 13.  
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list of remedies includes a jury instruction, if requested by the 
defendant.222 The Act also allows the admission of expert testimony 
“about factors that may affect the voluntariness . . . of a statement made 
during a custodial interrogation . . . .”223 The defendant must first establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that there are factors, not readily 
apparent, which might influence the voluntariness and reliability of the 
statement.224 Several examples include age, mental acuity, and 
interrogation technique.225 No other jurisdiction surveyed included a 
similar provision. 
B.  Innocence Project 
[62] The model legislation proposed by the Innocence Project requires 
law enforcement to record all custodial interrogations when they occur in 
places of detention.226 This recordation requirement encompasses both 
oral and written statements.227 It also requires the focus of the camera to 
be on both the suspect and the interrogator.228 A failure to record results in 
a presumption of inadmissibility that the state can overcome if the court 
finds, for example, that the defendant made the statement voluntarily, and 
it is reliable.229 Similar to other jurisdictions, a recording is not required if 
 
                                                                                                                         
222 Id. (“Those instructions must, at a minimum, explain to the jury that the police did not 
electronically record the entire interrogation process, though the law required them to do 
so, and that the jury is therefore, deprived of the most reliable and complete evidence of 
what was said and done by each of the participants.”). 
223 Id. § 13(c). 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 INNOCENCE PROJECT, AN ACT DIRECTING THE ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION §§ 2–3 (2008), http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
docs/09_model_legislation/Electronic_Recording_Custodial_ Interrogations_2009.pdf. 
227 Id. § 2(D). 
228 Id. § 3(C). 
229 Id. §§ 4, 5(B). 
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the person refuses to be recorded.230 However, the refusal must occur after 
consulting with counsel.231  
[63] In addition, although many jurisdictions carve out exceptions for 
statements made to a grand jury or in court, the Act requires the court to 
find by “clear and convincing evidence” that statements in these venues 
were made voluntarily.232 Another unusual feature is a “monitoring 
requirement.”233 Under that requirement, the appropriate state committee 
must monitor compliance with the recording requirements through 
documents submitted by the court and prosecutor.234 The court and 
prosecutor must submit these forms for cases where recorded 
conversations were introduced into evidence, unrecorded interrogations 
were introduced into evidence, or a guilty plea followed an 
interrogation.235 Finally, the state committee must keep the recordings 
until the conclusion of all appeals, including habeas corpus proceedings.236 
VI.  PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
A.  Michigan 
[64] In 1998, the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v. Fike rejected 
the argument that failure by the police to record a post-arrest statement 
constituted a violation of the State’s Due Process Clause.237 The court 
revisited the issue in 2004, and again rejected the defendant’s argument 
 
                                                                                                                         
230 See id. § 5. 
231 Id. § 5(D)(2). 
232 Id. § 6. 
233 Id. § 7. 
234 Id. § 7(A). 
235 Id. 
236 Id. § 8(B). 
237 577 N.W.2d 903, 906–07 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). 
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that law enforcement should be required to record custodial 
interrogations.238 
[65] In 2007, Michigan House introduced a bill that would require law 
enforcement to electronically record custodial interrogations in major 
felony cases.239 The bill punishes violations by excluding any evidence 
obtained absent a showing of “good cause” for not recording the 
interrogation.240 The bill is still pending.241  
[66] In 2006, the Michigan State Bar created a “Custodial Interrogation 
Recording Task Force.”242 Its purpose is as follows: 
 [t]he State Bar of Michigan has appointed a 
Custodial Interrogation Recording Task Force. The group 
consisting of State Bar members in the criminal defense, 
prosecution, judicial and law enforcement communities is 
charged with developing and promoting legislative, court 
rule, and funding changes that advance the use of audio and 
video electronic recording of custodial interrogations. The 
need for the task force arises from concerns about the 
wrongful convictions of innocent people, and the amount of 
time spent at trial and on appeal litigating who said and did 
what during an interrogation.243 
 
                                                                                                                         
238 People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
239 H.B. 4909, 2007-2008 Sess. § 7(1) (Mich. 2007), available at 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-2008/billintroduced/House/pdf/2007-
HIB-4909.pdf. 
240 Id. § 7(4). 
241 H.B. 4909, 2007-2008 Sess. § 7(1) (Mich. 2007). 
242 State Bar of Michigan, New Custodial Interrogation Recording Task Force Formed, 
May 16, 2006, http://www.michbar.org/news/releases/archives06/interrogation_ 
taskforce.cfm. 
243 Id. 
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[67] The current draft of the proposed bill is generally consistent with 
the requirements of several other jurisdictions. It requires the recording of 
custodial interrogations in “major felony” cases, which include crimes 
punishable by life imprisonment and crimes for which the statutory 
maximum exceeds twenty years.244 Law enforcement is required to record 
the complete interrogation, including Miranda warnings.245 There is no 
requirement that the individual have knowledge of or consent to the 
recording.246  
[68] A failure to record does not preclude the admissibility of a 
statement if the court finds there was “good cause.”247 If the court does not 
find good cause for the failure to record, the statement might nevertheless 
be admissible; however, the court must instruct the jury that law 
enforcement failed to record the statement as required by the statute.248  
CONCLUSION 
[69] The electronic recording of a suspect’s custodial interrogation has 
greatly benefited the criminal justice system on both sides of the aisle. The 
results have brought increased integrity to events taking place in police 
interrogation rooms. The system benefits where a record of the process for 
obtaining a suspect’s statement, including the advice of rights, is 
preserved.  
[70] From my experience, prosecutors and law enforcement are 
generally supportive of mandatory recording. When recording of an 
interrogation occurs, law enforcement is better able to question a suspect 
 
                                                                                                                         
244 H.B. 5763, 2009-2010 Sess. § 7(D) (Mich. 2010), available at 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2009-2010/billintroduced/House/pdf/2010-
HIB-5763.pdf. 
245 Id. § 8(1). 
246 Id. 
247 Id. § 9(1). 
248 Id. § 9(2). 
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and develop investigative leads because it greatly reduces the need to take 
copious notes. A recording requirement also enhances the quality of a 
prosecutor’s case. Recording custodial statements necessarily results in 
more convictions through both guilty pleas and trials. A jury’s ability to 
see and hear the defendant is very powerful incriminatory evidence. Better 
community relations and a reduction in lawsuits against police officers are 
indirect but significant benefits. 
[71] From the defense perspective, mandatory recording better protects 
the rights of suspects, especially if the recording requirement includes the 
advice of rights. It eliminates the swearing contests – typically won by the 
prosecution – that frequently accompany motions to suppress. It also 
reduces the number of false confessions and deters police misconduct. 
[72] From a judicial perspective, a recording requirement allows a court 
to evaluate more carefully whether the police adequately advised a suspect 
of his or her rights, as well assess the voluntariness of the statement. It 
also reduces the workload of trial and appellate courts in resolving 
confession-related issues. As one judge in the Eastern District of Michigan 
observed in connection with a motion to suppress a confession:  
 [a]ffording the Court the benefit of watching or 
listening to a videotaped or audiotaped statement is 
invaluable; indeed, a tape-recorded interrogation allows the 
court to more accurately assess whether a statement was 
given knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.249 
[73] As a former federal prosecutor, I tried, unsuccessfully, to create 
relevant guidelines for the federal law enforcement agencies in the Eastern 
District of Michigan. The district gave several reasons for rejecting those 
guidelines, including concerns that imposing such a requirement would 
reduce the number of confessions, be overly expensive, and otherwise 
would inhibit law enforcement. Those reasons have not been borne out in 
jurisdictions that require recording.  
 
                                                                                                                         
249 United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 870, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2005). 
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[74] Although the states have enacted various penalties for failing to 
record an interrogation, suppression of the statement, absent a showing of 
good cause, is the most effective remedy. By contrast, a presumption of 
involuntariness is not consistent with prevailing authority and erects too 
high a barrier for the admissibility of a non-recorded statement. 
Unfortunately, Congress has not enacted a recording requirement for 
federal law enforcement. Without further federal or state action, this 
beneficial tool for law enforcement cannot be realized. 
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Included 
Offenses 
Potential Penalties for  
Failure to Record 
AK  X   Not indicated 
Statement inadmissible if 
unexcused 
DC X    
Crimes of 
Violence250 
Rebuttable presumption that the 
statement was involuntary 
IL X    Murder 
Statements presumed to be 
inadmissible 
IA  X   Not specified None specified 
IN   X  All felonies 
Statements are inadmissible absent 
clear and convincing evidence of a  
listed exception 
ME X    
Serious 
crimes251 
No consequences as it concerns 
admissibility of the statement 
MD    X 
Murder, rape, 
and certain 
other sexual 
crimes 
None specified 
MA  X   Not specified 
No rule of exclusion but the 
defendant may request a jury 
instruction 
MA  X   Not specified 
No rule of exclusion but the  
defendant may request a jury instruction
 
                                                                                                                         
250 The District of Columbia defines a ”crime of  violence” as “aggravated assault; act of 
terrorism; arson; assault on a police officer (felony); assault with a dangerous weapon; 
assault with intent to kill, commit first degree sexual abuse, commit second degree sexual 
abuse, or commit child sexual abuse; assault with intent to commit any other offense; 
burglary; carjacking; armed carjacking; child sexual abuse; cruelty to children in the first 
degree; extortion or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence; gang recruitment, 
participation, or retention by the use or threatened use of force, coercion, or intimidation; 
kidnapping; malicious disfigurement; manslaughter; manufacture or possession of a 
weapon of mass destruction; mayhem; murder; robbery; sexual abuse in the first, second, 
or third degrees; use, dissemination, or detonation of a weapon of mass destruction; or an 
attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.”  D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-
1331(4) (2009). 
251 Maine does not define “serious crimes.”  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-
B(1)(K) (2009). 
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Included 
Offenses 
Potential Penalties for  
Failure to Record 
MN  X   Not specified 
Statement inadmissible if the 
violation is “substantial”252 
MO X    
Murder and 
other serious 
specified 
crimes253 
No rule of exclusion. The Governor 
may withhold funds if the agency is 
not in compliance 
MT X    Felonies 
No rule of exclusion but the 
defendant may request a Jury 
instruction 
NE X    
Murder and 
other 
specified 
felonies 
No rule of exclusion but the  defendant may request a 
jury instruction 
NH  X   Not specified 
No requirement to record custodial 
interrogations, however, if do so, 
must record the entire interrogation 
otherwise it is inadmissible. 
NJ    X 
Murder and 
other 
specified 
felonies 
No rule of exclusion but the  defendant may request a 
jury instruction 
 
                                                                                                                         
252 The Minnesota Supreme Court specifically avoided specifying when a failure to 
record would be “substantial.” “This determination is to be made by the trial court after 
considering all relevant circumstances bearing on substantiality, including those set forth 
in . . . the Model Penal Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.” State v. Scales, 518 
N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994). Quoting from the Model Penal Code, several of these 
factors include the unlawfulness of the conduct, whether it was willful, the influence of 
the violation on the defendant’s decision to make a statement, deterrence and whether 
there are alternate remedies other than exclusion of the statement. Id. at n.5. 
253 Missouri requires the recording of “[a]ll custodial interrogations of persons suspected 
of committing or attempting to commit murder in the first degree, murder in the second 
degree, assault in the first degree, assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree, 
domestic assault in the first degree, elder abuse in the first degree, robbery in the first 
degree, arson in the first degree, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, kidnapping, statutory 
rape in the first degree, statutory sodomy in the first degree, child abuse, or child 
kidnapping shall be recorded when feasible.” MO. REV. STAT. § 590.701.2(2) (2009). 
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Included 
Offenses 
Potential Penalties for  
Failure to Record 
NM X    Felonies No rule of exclusion 
NC X    Murder 
Failure to comply may result in the 
inadmissibility of the statement. 
The defendant may request a jury 
instruction which the court must 
give 
OR X    
Initially, 
aggravated 
murder and 
then other 
offenses 
carrying 
mandatory 
minimum 
sentences 
The court cannot dismiss charges 
or otherwise exclude the 
admissibility of the statement. The 
defendant may request a jury 
instruction, which the court is 
required to give 
TX X    All crimes 
The statement is inadmissible if 
obtained as a result of custodial 
interrogation 
WI X    All felonies 
No rule of exclusion but the 
defendant may request a Jury 
instruction 
 
 
